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State v. Hunt: Rekindling Requirements for
Impeaching One's Own Witness
North Carolina Rule of Evidence 607 permits any party to impeachI a wit-
ness, even the party calling that witness.2 On its face, the rule allows a party to
call a witness for no other reason than to impeach that witness with prior incon-
sistent statements that otherwise would not be admissible. A crafty attorney
may do this in hopes that the jury will ignore the judge's limiting instructions
which admitted these statements for credibility purposes only and not as sub-
stantive evidence.
Before Congress promulgated the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975,3 an
attorney could impeach his own witness only if that witness's testimony was
both surprising and damaging.4 Both the Federal and North Carolina Rules of
Evidence eliminated these requirements with rule 607.5 Yet courts gradually
have reinstated requirements for impeaching one's own witness to prevent par-
ties from misusing impeachment to get impermissible hearsay before the jury.6
In State v. Hunt 7 the North Carolina Supreme Court joined other courts that
have limited an attorney's ability to impeach his own witness. The court's hold-
ing prevents a party from using rule 607 to disguise inadmissible hearsay as
impeachment.8 The court also held that prior conflicting statements that an
impeached witness denied making could not be introduced to corroborate the
testimony of a later witness.9
This Note provides an overview of federal and North Carolina evidence
rules 607 and traces the requirements that courts have established for using
prior inconsistent statements to impeach one's own witness. It examines why
the Hunt court was correct in clarifying the issue for North Carolina courts and
limiting the opportunity for impeaching one's own witness. The Note con-
cludes, however, that the court's limitations on rule 607 are more stringent than
necessary to accomplish the goal of preventing the misuse of impeachment and
corroboration as pretexts for introducing impermissible hearsay. The Note sug-
gests that a better remedy for subterfuge impeachment is to apply a good faith
1. Impeachment is an attack on the credibility of a witness. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
678 (5th ed. 1979). It is accomplished by "showing the existence of bias; a prior inconsistent state-
ment; untruthful or dishonest character, or defective ability to observe, remember, or recount the
matter about which the witness testifies." State v. Anderson, 88 N.C. App. 545, 548, 364 S.E.2d 163,
165 (1988) (citing E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 33, at 72-73 (3d ed. 1984)).
2. Rule 607 states: "The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the
party calling him." N.C.R. EVID. 607. This is identical to federal rule 607. See FED. R. EVID. 607.
3. Rules of Evidence, Pub. L. No. 93-595, § 1, 88 Stat. 1934 (1975) (codified at FED. R. EVID.
607).
4. D. LOUSELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 297, at 186 (1979 & Supp. 1989).
5. See FED. R. EVID. 607; N.C.R. EVID. 607.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 77-87.
7. 324 N.C. 343, 378 S.E.2d 754 (1989).
8. Id. at 350, 378 S.E.2d at 758.
9. Id. at 352, 378 S.E.2d at 759.
standard on the attorney and to require the witness to testify to some important
piece of evidence.
Deborah Sykes was a 26-year-old copy editor for the Winston-Salem Jour-
nal and Sentinel.10 At 6:45 a.m. on August 10, 1984, she was raped and stabbed
to death in a grassy field a few blocks from the newspaper's offices. 11 Darryl
Eugene Hunt was brought to trial on a felony murder charge for her death.1 2 At
trial, three witnesses for the State identified Hunt in incriminating circumstances
the morning of the murder.13 Hunt testified that from about 11:00 p.m. to 8:30
a.m., he was with his friend Sammy Mitchell at the McKee household. 14 Three
residents of the McKee household corroborated this testimony.' 5
Along with its three eyewitnesses, the State called Marie Crawford, a four-
teen-year-old prostitute, who is severely emotionally disturbed.' 6 At trial, a
therapist and a psychologist testified that Marie "could not be trusted to tell the
truth."1 7 The State, however, contended that Marie made written statements,
which strongly contradicted the defendant's alibi, to the police detective investi-
gating the homicide, Officer Daulton.18 After several preliminary questions, the
prosecutor asked Marie directly whether she had come to his office and given a
statement.1 9 She admitted that she had come to his office, but at first denied she
10. Id. at 356, 378 S.E.2d at 762 (Mitchell, J., dissenting).
11. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 3, Hunt (No. 84 CRS 42263).
12. Hunt, 324 N.C. at 344, 378 S.E.2d at 754.
13. Thomas Murphy testified that on his way to work, he saw Hunt on the street comer near
the field with his right arm clasped around the victim. Id. at 357, 378 S.E.2d at 762 (Mitchell, J.,
dissenting). Johnny Gray called the police immediately after seeing the person whom he identified
as the defendant in the field beating the victim and then tucking his shirt into his pants as he ran
from the scene. Id. (Mitchell, J., dissenting). Roger Weaver, a hotel employee, identified the defend-
ant as the man who entered the hotel's restroom that morning. Id. at 358, 378 S.E.2d at 762-63
(Mitchell, J., dissenting). One half-hour later, he discovered bloody paper towels and red-tinted
water in the sink after the defendant left. Id. (Mitchell, J., dissenting). A month later, when Hunt's
picture appeared in the newspaper, Weaver identified him as a man who "resembled" the one he had
seen. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 16-19, Hunt (No. 84 CRS 42263). Weaver identified Hunt in a
lineup seven months later. Id. Defendant introduced evidence at trial that the identifications by
these witnesses were questionable. Id. at 5-19; see infra note 131.
14. Hunt, 324 N.C. at 344-45, 378 S.E.2d at 755.
15. Id. at 345, 378 S.E.2d at 755.
16. Marie Crawford began working as a prostitute at age 11. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at
19. She had been institutionalized in mental-health and juvenile-detention facilities several times.
Id. She has learning disabilities, cannot read well, sees words backwards, and writes only a little. Id.
at 25.
17. Id. at 22.
18. The State said Marie gave two signed statements to Officer Daulton, dated August 30, 1984,
and September 11, 1984. The statements said:
[O]n August 10th Mr. Darryl Hunt and Sammy Mitchell were at Motel 6 and Darryl Hunt
and Sammy Mitchell left the room at about 6:00 a.m. and that they were both wearing
black shirts and black pants and Darryl told me he was going to call a cab. The next time I
saw Darryl was about 9:30 a.m. and he was nervous when he came back to the motel room
and he said he needed a drink. Darryl had mud or grass stains on his pants knees[.]
[A]bout two k'eeks ago me and Darryl were at Motel 6 and Darryl was saying some stuff
about the white lady that got killed downtown and Darryl said that Sammy did it when we
were watching the Crimestoppers on the news and the television and I said to Darryl I
wish I knew who killed that lady because I could use the money and Darryl said Sammy
did it and he fucked her too.
Hunt, 324 N.C. at 345-46, 378 S.E.2d at 755-56.
19. Id. at 345, 378 S.E.2d at 755.
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had made a statement and then later said she did not remember giving the prose-
cutor or the police detective a statement.20 A voir dire followed, during which
the prosecutor showed Marie the statements and Marie again denied giving or
signing them.2 1 The court then denied defendant's motion to prevent the prose-
cution from cross-examining its own witness with rule 607.22 Although the de-
fense argued that under rule 403 the prejudice to defendant "overwhelmed" the
probative value, the trial court held that under the 403 balancing test, the proba-
tive value of the statements outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice or
confusion.23
In front of the jury, Marie again denied making the prior statements, but
admitted signing the paper.24 Defendant objected to reading the statements to
the jury, but the trial court overruled the objection. 25 After asking if Officer
Daulton would testify later, the court held that the statements were admissible
for the purpose of corroborating the testimony of a later witness and instructed
the jury.26 The prosecution then read the statements to Marie in front of the
jury. When Officer Daulton testified, the prosecution reintroduced the state-
ments through the officer.27 When the State offered the statements into evi-
dence, defendant again objected, saying that the statements could not be used as
substantive evidence, but only to challenge Marie's credibility.28 The court
overruled the objection and allowed both statements into evidence without giv-
ing any limiting instructions.2 9 When the trial judge gave final jury instructions,
he told the jurors that they should use Marie's conflicting statements only to
determine her credibility.30 Yet the judge then reiterated the testimony of Of-
ficer Daulton and the substance of Marie's statements.3 1 The jury, after seven-
teen hours of deliberation, convicted Hunt of first-degree murder based on the
felony-murder doctrine and later sentenced him to life imprisonment. 32
Defendant appealed directly to the North Carolina Supreme Court, bypas-
sing an appeal to the North Carolina Court of Appeals. 33 The supreme court
granted Hunt a new trial.3 4 The court held that the prosecution could not im-
peach Marie with Officer Daulton's extrinsic evidence of her prior inconsistent
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 346-47, 378 S.E.2d at 756.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 347, 378 S.E.2d at 756.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 347-48, 378 S.E.2d at 756-57.
31. Id. at 348, 378 S.E.2d at 757.
32. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 2, Hunt (No. 84 CRS 42263).
33. When a defendant is convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to either death or
life imprisonment, he can appeal as of right directly to the supreme court. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-
27(a) (1989).
34. Hunt, 324 N.C. at 356, 378 S.E.2d at 761.
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statements because they concerned collateral issues.35 Marie's hearsay state-
ments concerned Hunt's alibi, which was a material issue; her testimony, how-
ever, was not material to the issues. The court correctly focused on Marie's
testimony, not her prior statements, to determine materiality.36
More significantly, the court held that because of the jury's inability to dis-
tinguish impeachment from substantive evidence, 3 7 impeaching one's own wit-
ness using rule 607 "may not be permitted where employed as a mere subterfuge
to get before the jury evidence not otherwise admissible."'38 The court noted
that impeaching one's own witness is legitimate only in "rare" cases. 39 The
court stated that this was not such a case because Marie's testimony was not
critical and because the State "appeared to know before Marie was called to the
stand that she would not cooperate."' 4 The court also held that the statements
could not be admitted as corroboration of Officer Daulton's testimony because
the statements were not prior consistent statements of the officer but were hear-
say statements by Marie.4 1 Finally, the court said that the statements also failed
to satisfy the requirements of North Carolina Rule of Evidence 403 because
"[tihe prejudicial effect of this testimony far outweighed the need to show Marie
to be less than credible.., or the need to bolster Officer Daulton's credibility." 42
The goal of impeachment is to "reduce or discount the credibility of a wit-
ness for the purpose of inducing the jury to give less weight to his testimony." 43
This can be done by showing a defect in the witness's perception, memory, nar-
ration, or truthfulness.44 A primary method of attacking the credibility of a
witness is through prior inconsistent statements. The witness may have made
35. Id. at 348, 378 S.E.2d at 757.
36. Since Marie's testimony contained little of value to the State, the issues in the testimony
were collateral, and the State could not prove them with extrinsic evidence. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 160-166.
37. Interestingly, the Hunt court acknowledged that jury instructions alone cannot mitigate the
jury's confusion over impeachment and substantive evidence. See Hunt, 324 N.C. at 349, 378 S.E.2d
at 757. In fact, the court stated that this "danger of confusion has been widely recognized." Id.
However, the court later stated that an effective jury instruction qualified as one of the rare situations
in which a party can impeach its own witness. Id. at 350, 378 S.E.2d at 758. See supra text accom-
panying notes 18-20.
38. Hunt, 324 N.C. at 349, 378 S.E.2d at 757 (quoting United States v. Morlang, 531 F.2d 183,
190 (4th Cir. 1975)).
39. Id. at 350, 378 S.E.2d at 758. The court cited three "rare" situations in which federal
courts have been willing to allow impeachment of one's own witness. Id. These included when the
witness' testimony is extensive and vital; when the party calling the witness is genuinely surprised;
and when the judge gives an effective limiting instruction. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes
120, 142-59.
40. Hunt, 324 N.C. at 351, 378 S.E.2d at 758.
41. Id. at 352, 378 S.E.2d at 759.
42. Id. at 353, 378 S.E.2d at 759. On a separate issue, the court also held that the police
department's lineup identification by the hotel employee violated defendant's sixth amendment right
to effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 354-55, 378 S.E.2d at 760-61. The court said the police
should have allowed defendant's attorney to view the lineup, but that defendant had waived this
right by failing to object when the witness in front of the jury pointed out defendant as the man he
had identified in the lineup. Id. at 355, 378 S.E.2d at 761.
43. 1 H. BRANDIs, BRANDIS ON NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 38, at 192 (3d ed. 1988 &
Supp. 1989) (quoting State v. Nelson, 200 N.C. 69, 72, 156 S.E. 154, 156 (1930); State v. Adcox, 303
N.C. 133, 141, 277 S.E.2d 398, 403 (1981)).
44. Id.
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these inconsistent statements orally or in writing, in or outside a formal hearing
or trial.45 Inconsistent statements for impeachment are admissible simply for
the jury to consider in evaluating the witness's credibility, but not as substantive
proof of what is asserted in the statements." Therefore, an inconsistent state-
ment is not usually admissible until the witness has testified to something that is
inconsistent with the previous statement.47
The method by which a prior inconsistent statement is proved depends
upon the relationship of the witness's testimony to the prior statements. For
example, if the inconsistent statement relates to a material issue, it can be proved
by extrinsic evidence;48 that is, other witnesses can testify about the statement
without first calling the statement to the witness's attention.49 The statement
relates to a "material" issue if it is "pertinent and material" to the issues or if it
involves "the subject matter in regard to which [the witness] is examined." 50
Conversely, if the prior statement relates to a collateral,5 issue but shows
the witness's partiality or bias toward the cross-examiner's adversary, or "the
45. Id. § 46, at 215-16.
46. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, certain prior inconsistent statements are not hearsay
and can be used as substantive evidence as well as for impeachment. Federal rule 801(d)(1)(A) states
that prior statements given at a trial or hearing and subject to cross-examination are not hearsay if
"inconsistent with [the witness'] testimony, and ... given under oath." FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A),
In North Carolina, however, all prior inconsistent statements are considered hearsay and can be
used only for impeachment purposes, unless a hearsay exception applies. See State v. Bartlett, 77
N.C. App. 747, 752, 336 S.E.2d 100, 103 (1985). As the commentary to the North Carolina Evi-
dence Code notes, the federal rule "departs markedly from the common law in North Carolina" by
excluding these prior statements from hearsay, and so "[a]ccordingy, the language of Fed. R. Evid.
801(d)(1)... was deleted." N.C.R. EvID. 801 commentary. This indicates North Carolina's reser-
vations about a jury basing a criminal conviction or civil judgment solely on the substantive use of a
witness's prior statement. Note, The New North Carolina Rules of Evidence: Privileges, Relevancy,
Competency, Impeachment, and Expert Opinion, 62 N.C.L. REv. 1290, 1304-05 (1984).
47. 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 43, § 46, at 219. For example, in State v. Platt, 85 N.C. App,
220, 354 S.E.2d 332, disc rev. denied, 320 N.C. 516, 358 S.E.2d 529 (1987), the witness never testi-
fied about the events he saw, but merely denied making a statement to police. Id. at 224-25, 354
S.E.2d at 334-35. The prosecution then called a police officer to testify about the statement lie took
from the witness and to read the statement to the jury. The court refused to admit the contents of
the statements as impeachment evidence because "[a]s Townsend never testified to his recollection of
the events. . . ,he never 'testified to something with which [his statement was] inconsistent ....'"
Id. at 225, 354 S.E.2d at 335 (quoting I H. BRANDIS, BRANDIS ON NORTH CAROLINA EviDENCE
§ 46, at 176 (2d rev. ed. 1982 & Supp. 1983)).
48. Extrinsic evidence is external evidence, or evidence "not contained in the body of an agree-
ment, contract and the like." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 529; see I H. BRANDIS,
supra note 43, § 48, at 224.
49. State v. Green, 296 N.C. 183, 193, 250 S.E.2d 197, 203 (1978). See 1 H. BRANDIs, supra
note 43, § 46, at 221. North Carolina's Evidence Rule 613 omits subsection (b) of federal rule 613.
See N.C.R. EvID. 613 commentary. Federal rule 613(b) bars extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent
statements, unless the witness is given a chance to explain or deny the statements and 'he opponent
is given the chance to interrogate the witness. FED. R. EviD. 613(b). Since this subsection is omit-
ted from the state rule, requirements are governed by North Carolina case law. N.C.R. EvID. 613
commentary.
50. Green, 296 N.C. at 193, 250 S.E.2d at 203 (citations omitted). For example, when a defense
witness's testimony about defendant's alibi differed from prior statements made by that witness to
the police, that testimony was material because it "respected the main subject matter in regard to
which such witnesses were examined, namely, the whereabouts of the defendant at the time tile
offense is alleged to have been committed." Id. at 194, 250 S.E.2d at 204 (quoting State v. Wellmon,
222 N.C. 215, 217-18, 22 S.E.2d 437, 439 (1942)). The State could then call a witness to testify
about the prior inconsistent statements given to the police.
51. Collateral facts consist of evidence "outside the controversy, or... not directly connected
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witness'[s] hostility toward the cross-examiner's cause," the cross-examiner is
not bound by the witness's denial of bias. 52 The witness has a chance to deny or
explain the bias, but if she denies it, the prior statements can be proved by other
witnesses. 53
Finally, if the statement relates to a collateral issue, the party may not con-
tradict it with other witnesses' testimony about the prior statements.54 In such a
case, "the witness's answers on cross-examination are conclusive, and the party
who draws out such answers will not be permitted to contradict them by other
testimony."'55 The policy behind refusing to allow extrinsic evidence for a col-
lateral matter "is not the saving of time and confusion,... but the protection of
the other party against the hearsay use by the jury of the previous statement."' 56
Determining what is a material issue and what is a collateral issue is not
always easy. The key to materiality is that the prior statement must concern the
subject matter about which the witness is questioned, and the subject matter of
the witness's testimony must be "itself material to an issue in the case."' 57 A
court therefore must examine the materiality of the statement in light of the
witness's testimony, not the materiality of the conflicting prior statements alone.
For example, a witness's denial of a prior inconsistent statement makes that
testimony collateral because a "denial did not tend to establish any material fact
in the case; it was negative testimony which proved nothing."58 The rule is that
"a negative answer is not damaging to the examiner, but merely disappointing,
and may not be thus impeached."5 9
Before federal and North Carolina rule 607 were enacted, the traditional
rule was that a party could not impeach its own witness.60 Courts developed
this rule for three reasons: 1) The calling party was said to vouch for the testi-
with the principal matter or issue in dispute." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 237.
See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
52. State v. Cutshall, 278 N.C. 334, 349, 180 S.E.2d 745, 754 (1971).
53. 1 H. BRANDIs, supra note 43, § 48, at 226-27.
54. Green, 296 N.C. at 192, 250 S.E.2d at 203.
55. Id.
56. State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 198, 214, 166 S.E.2d 652, 663 (1969) (quoting MCCORMICK, LAW
OF EVIDENCE § 36, at 67 (2d ed. 1954)).
57. Green, 296 N.C. at 193, 250 S.E.2d at 204. Several cases, however, indicate that the court
should focus on the prior statement, not the testimony, to see if it is collateral or material. See State
v. Cutshall, 278 N.C. 334, 349, 180 S.E.2d 745, 754 (1971); Jones v. Jones, 80 N.C. 246, 247 (1879);
State v. Patterson, 24 N.C. (1 Ired.) 346, 353-54 (1842). If that were the case, then Marie's state-
ments were material and not collateral, and could be proved by extrinsic evidence.
58. Moore, 275 N.C. at 213, 166 S.E.2d at 662. In Moore defendant's brother denied that de-
fendant admitted he shot the victim. Id. The sheriff could not testify that the witness told him that
defendant made the admission because the witness's denial was a collateral matter that could not be
impeached with extrinsic evidence. Id.; see State v. Williams, 322 N.C. 452, 456, 368 S.E.2d 624,
626 (1988).
59. Moore, 275 N.C. at 213, 166 S.E.2d at 662-63 (quoting McCoRMIcK, LAW OF EVIDENCE
§ 36, at 67 (2d ed. 1954)). Unlike the North Carolina courts, some courts have distinguished be-
tween a witness's denial and a witness's failure to recall. If a witness states that she cannot recall,
"there is nothing harmful in evidence and any attempt to 'impeach' becomes subterfuge.... How-
ever, where a witness affirmatively denies that the defendant made an admission of guilt to him,
there is at least an exculpatory inference that something did not take place as alleged and impeach-
ment should be allowed." United States v. Long Soldier, 562 F.2d 601, 605 (8th Cir. 1977).
60. D. LOUSELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 4, § 297, at 182.
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mony of its own witnesses; 2) the calling party was morally bound by that testi-
mony; and 3) the court wanted to prevent attorneys from coercing testimony by
threatening potentially uncooperative witnesses with impeachment of their char-
acter.61 Courts have recognized that these ancient reasons no longer apply be-
cause parties in modern trials do not vouch for their witnesses and are "rarely
able to select their witnesses: they must take them where they find them." 62
The voucher rule put the calling party at the mercy of its own witness because
"if the witness tells a lie, the adversary will not attack, and the calling party,
under the rule, cannot."' 63 As a result, many courts developed exceptions to the
voucher rule so that parties could impeach their own witnesses if their witness'
testimony both surprised and affirmatively damaged the calling party.64 North
Carolina courts required that the party's witness had to mislead and surprise the
calling attorney, and that the "testimony as to a material fact [was] contrary to
what the [party] had a right to expect."' 65 In those cases, the North Carolina
courts admitted prior inconsistent statements of one's own witness "'to show
the [attorney] was surprised by the witness's testimony at trial and to explain
why the witness was called by the [party].' "66
When Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975,67 it abol-
ished the voucher rule with rule 607.68 North Carolina's legislature followed
suit in 1983 by enacting the identical rule.69 The commentary to the North
Carolina Evidence Code states that rule 607 "abandons the traditional common-
law rule that a party 'vouches' for a witness by calling him and, therefore, may
not impeach his own witness."'70 Rule 607 permits any party to attack the credi-
bility of a witness, including the party calling the witness.71 As the rule is writ-
ten, a party could impeach a witness without regard to either the motive of the
party or the formalities for impeaching a witness.
In reality, several restrictions remain on impeaching one's own witness with
prior inconsistent statements. The general requirements for using prior inconsis-
tent statements discussed above still apply when a party impeaches its own wit-
61. Id.
62. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294-97 (1973)..
63. E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 38, at 83 (3d ed. 1984).
64. Graham, Employing Inconsistent Statements for Impeachment and as Substantive Evidence:
A Critical Review and Proposed Amendments of Federal Rules of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A), 613, and
607, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1565, 1612 (1977).
65. State v. Pope, 287 N.C. 505, 513, 215 S.E.2d 139, 145 (1975); accord State v. Lovette, 299
N.C. 642, 649, 263 S.E.2d 751, 756 (1980).
66. State v. McDonald, 312 N.C. 264, 269-70, 321 S.E.2d 849, 852 (1984) (quoting State v.
Cope, 309 N.C. 47, 51, 305 S.E.2d 676, 679 (1983)).
67. Rules of Evidence, Pub. L. No. 93-595, § 1, 88 Stat. 1934 (1975) (codified at FED. R. EViD.
607).
68. The Advisory Committee on the Proposed Rules stated that the "traditional rule against
impeaching one's own witness is abandoned as based on false premises.... The substantial inroads
into the old rule made over the years by decisions, rules, and statutes are evidence of doubts as to its
basic soundness and workability." FED. R. EVID. 607 advisory committee's note.
69. Act of July 7, 1983, ch. 701, § 1, 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 672 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
ch. 8C, Evidence Code, Rule 607 (1988)).
70. N.C.R. EVID. 607 commentary.
71. FED. R. EVID, 607; N.C.R. EVID. 607.
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ness.7 2 In addition, the judge, upon request, must give jurors a limiting
instruction telling them to consider the prior inconsistent statement only for
judging credibility, and not as substantive evidence. 73 A court's failure to give
the requested limiting instruction when appropriate is reversible error.74 Also,
North Carolina and Federal Rule of Evidence 403 require the judge to exclude
the prior statement if the potential prejudice and confusion caused by the evi-
dence substantially outweigh its probative value.75 This limitation on rule 607 is
evident from the commentary to North Carolina's rule 607: "The impeaching
proof must be relevant within the meaning of Rule 401 and 403 ....
Along with these general requirements, courts have hesitated to let parties
impeach their own witnesses despite the clear wording of rule 607. 77 Many
courts now hold that "impeachment by prior inconsistent statement may not be
permitted where employed as mere subterfuge to get before the jury evidence not
otherwise admissible." 78 Indeed, all the circuits of the United States Courts of
Appeals are in agreement that "evidence that is inadmissible for substantive pur-
poses may not be purposely introduced under the pretense of impeachment. '79
Courts have created this exception because of a fear that jurors will not "distin-
guish between impeachment and substantive evidence," and will permit defend-
ants to be "convicted on the basis of unsworn testimony." 80 As the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held:
[I]t would be an abuse of [rule 607], in a criminal case, for the prosecu-
tion to call a witness that it knew would not give it useful evidence, just
so it could introduce hearsay evidence against the defendant in the
hope that the jury would miss the subtle distinction between impeach-
ment and substantive evidence-or, if it didn't miss it, would ignore
it.81
72. See supra text accompanying notes 43-59. For example, extrinsic evidence can be used to
bring out prior inconsistent statements only if the witness's testimony is material. Id.
73. State v. Erby, 56 N.C. App. 358, 361, 289 S.E.2d 86, 88 (1982).
74. Id.
75. Rule 403 states: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of the unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence." FED. R. EvID. 403; N.C.R. EVID. 403.
76. N.C.R. EvID. 607 commentary.
77. See infra notes 78-79.
78. United States v. Morlang, 531 F.2d 183, 190 (4th Cir. 1975). See, eg., cases cited infi'a note
79.
79. United States v. Peterman, 841 F.2d 1474, 1479 n.3 (10th Cir. 1988) (stating that every
circuit now agrees with the restriction of impeachment that operates as subterfuge), cerL denied, 109
S. Ct. 783 (1989); see United States v. Frappier, 807 F.2d 257, 259 (1st Cir. 1986), cert denied, 481
U.S. 1006 (1987); United States v. Johnson, 802 F.2d 1459, 1466 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Balogh's of Coral
Gables, Inc. v. Getz, 798 F.2d 1356, 1358 n.2 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc); United States v. Hogan,
763 F.2d 697, 701-03 (5th Cir. 1985), corrected, 771 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1985); Unites States v. Web-
ster, 734 F.2d 1191, 1192 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Crouch, 731 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1105 (1985); United States v. Fay, 668 F.2d 375, 379 (8th Cir. 1981);
United States v. DeLillo, 620 F.2d 939, 946 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 449 U.S. 835 (1980); United
States v. Morlang, 531 F.2d 183, 190 (4th Cir. 1975); United States v. Dye, 508 F.2d 1226, 1234 (6th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 974 (1975).
80. Morlang, 531 F.2d at 190.
81. Webster, 734 F.2d at 1192.
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The federal courts' new rule does not mean that a party can never impeach
its witness even if it knows that some damaging statements will be elicited. Par-
ties can resort to introducing prior inconsistent statements "where the trial
court, in its discretion, determines that it is necessary to alleviate the harshness
of subjecting a party to the mercy of a witness who is recalcitrant or who may
have been unscrupulously tampered with."82 Impeachment is only improper "if
there is no relevant contribution to be made by the witness's principal testimony
on direct examination. 83 For example, a party can call a witness whose testi-
mony is helpful and then "attempt to impeach him, about those aspects of his
testimony which conflicted."'84 Unlike the pre-607 rule, "[i]mpeachment under
Rule 607 is not limited to occasions where the party calling the witness is sur-
prised or misled by the testimony."85 Instead, several courts have applied a
good-faith standard on the part of the attorney in determining whether impeach-
ment is permissible.86 As the the Seventh Circuit stated:
Suppose the government called an adverse witness that it thought
would give evidence both helpful and harmful to it, but it also thought
that the harmful aspect could be nullified by introducing the witness's
prior inconsistent statement.... [W]e are at a loss to understand why
the government should be put to the choice between the Scylla of for-
going impeachment and the Charybdis of not calling at all a witness
from whom it expects to elicit genuinely helpful evidence. The good
faith standard strikes a better balance.8 7
Before Hunt, the North Carolina Supreme Court never had mandated re-
quirements for impeaching one's own witness under rule 607. In one case, the
court merely stated that because rule 607 permits a witness to be impeached by
any party, "the State had the right under Rule 607 to elicit contradictory testi-
mony. '' 88 The North Carolina Court of Appeals had reached conflicting deci-
sions on this issue.89 In State v. Bell 90 the court held that although rule 607
technically abolished any limitations on impeaching one's own witness, "there
exists a real danger that this rule, if not applied cautiously,.., would make fair
82. Morlang, 531 F.2d at 190.
83. Frappier, 807 F.2d at 259.
84. United States v. DeLillo, 620 F.2d 939, 946 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 449 U.S. 835 (1980).
The court in DeLillo affirmed the admission of a tape recording to impeach part of the testimony of a
State witness. Id. at 946-47. The court said that because the witness' corroborating testimony was
"essential in many areas of the government's case," the State could impeach him on other conflicting
matters. Id. at 946.
85. Frappier, 807 F.2d at 259 (quoting Robinson v. Watts Detective Agency, 685 F.2d 729, 740
(1st Cir. 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983)).
86. See ag., United States v. Webster, 734 F.2d 1191, 1193 (7th Cir. 1984).
87. Id.
88. State v. Covington, 315 N.C. 352, 357, 338 S.E.2d 310, 314 (1986). The court noted that
this impeachment also met the pre-607 requirements because the State was genuinely surprised by
the testimony. Id. at 358, 338 S.E.2d at 314.
89. Compare State v. Bell, 87 N.C. App. 626, 633, 362 S.E.2d 288, 292 (1987) (requiring that a
party need to impeach the witness) with State v. Hyleman, 89 N.C. App. 424, 426-27, 366 S.E.2d
530, 532 (1988) (permitting impeachment if the witness's testimony is needed), rev'd on other
grounds, 324 N.C. 506, 379 S.E.2d 830 (1989).
90. 87 N.C. App. 626, 362 S.E.2d 288 (1987).
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game of almost any out-of-court statement ever made by any witness." 91 The
court, therefore, required that the trial court decide "whether the witness's testi-
mony is other than what the State had reason to expect or whether a need to
impeach otherwise exists." 92 Four months later, in State v. Hyleman,93 the
court of appeals relaxed its impeachment requirements by permitting a second
witness to impeach the testimony of a witness who denied making a statement.94
The court stated that the witness's "actions were important to the State's case,
and his testimony was needed." It added that the State had acted in good faith
in impeaching the witness.95
Besides intentionally impeaching one's own witness as subterfuge, an attor-
ney also may use rule 607 to introduce inadmissible hearsay disguised as a prior
consistent statement. The attorney would do this by 1) bringing out a prior
inconsistent statement while impeaching his own witness, 2) introducing a sec-
ond witness who heard the statement to testify about it, and then 3) arguing that
those prior statements of the first witness should be admissible to corroborate
the testimony of the second witness. 9 6 Clearly, prior statements can be used to
corroborate97 a witness's testimony. However, the testimony being corroborated
cannot be hearsay also.98 If the court permitted this, a party could use prior
hearsay statements of one witness to corroborate the hearsay testimony of an-
other witness.
In North Carolina, prior consistent statements are admissible "solely for
the purpose of affirming the credibility of the witness, and, upon proper request,
the jury must be instructed accordingly." 99 Unlike other jurisdictions, North
91. Id. at 633, 362 S.E.2d at 292.
92. Id. The court said that without such restraints, "the rule too easily camouflages a ruse
whereby a party may call an unfriendly witness solely to justify the subsequent call of a second
witness to testify about a prior inconsistent statement." Id.
93. 89 N.C. App. 424, 366 S.E.2d 530 (1988), rev'd on other grounds, 324 N.C. 506, 379 S.E.2d
830 (1989). The North Carolina Supreme Court held that on retrial, the trial court must re-examine
the impeachment issue in Hyleman in light of the test given in Hunt. Hyleman, 324 N.C. at 511, 379
S.E.2d at 833.
94. Hyleman, 89 N.C. App. at 426-27, 366 S.E.2d at 532.
95. Id. at 427, 366 S.E.2d at 532. Judge Becton strongly dissented, stating that he was "con-
cerned with what may be a growing trend of using prior inconsistent statements as a subterfuge to
get before the jury hearsay evidence not otherwise admissible." Id. at 430, 366 S.E.2d at 533 (Bec-
ton, J., dissenting). He noted the State's need for the witness's testimony did not justify impeach-
ment, and that the State knew that the witness was going-to deny his previous statements. Id. at 430.
366 S.E.2d at 533-34 (Becton, J., dissenting).
96. This is exactly what the State in Hunt argued to the trial court. Hunt, 324 N.C. at 347, 378
S.E.2d at 756. The State contended that even if the statements were not admissible as impeachment,
Marie's statements corroborated Officer Daulton's testimony. Id. at 352, 378 S.E.2d at 759. The
problem, however, with that argument was that Officer Daulton's testimony about the content of the
statements also was hearsay. Id.
97. Corroboration is the process of persuading the trier of fact that a witness is credible. 1 H.
BRANDiS, supra note 43, § 49, at 230. It is the opposite of impeachment. Id. North Carolina courts
have defined "corroborate" as "to strengthen, to add weight or credibility to a thing by additional
and confirming facts or evidence." State v. Higgenbottom, 312 N.C. 760, 769, 324 S.E.2d 834, 840
(1985) (quoting State v. Case, 253 N.C. 130, 135, 16 S.E.2d 429, 433 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S.
830 (1961)).
98. See Wolfe v. Hewes, 41 N.C. App. 88, 92, 254 S.E.2d 204, 207, disc rev. denied, 298 N.C.
206 (1979).
99. 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 43, § 52, at 242 (footnotes omitted); see State v. Erby, 56 N.C.
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Carolina does not require impeachment of the witness before a party can intro-
duce prior consistent statements to boost that witness's credibility.I1° Prior con-
sistent statements, however, are admissible only when they actually are
consistent with the witness's trial testimony.101 A witness's prior contradictory
statement cannot be admitted "under the guise of corroborating his testi-
mony." 102 In addition, "the state may not, under the guise of 'corroboration,'
introduce 'new' evidence-that is, evidence which substantially and materially
goes beyond that which it is intended to corroborate."' 10 3 The prior statement
need not parallel exactly the specific facts from the witness's testimony "so long
as the prior statement in fact tends to add weight or credibility to such
testimony. ' '1o4
Generally, prior consistent statements made outside the courtroom by
someone other than the witness are not admissible in North Carolina to corrobo-
rate the witness's testimony. 10 5 "A corroborative statement is admissible only
to corroborate the testimony of the witness who made the statement."'1 6 North
Carolina courts, however, have permitted a third person's statements to corrob-
orate the testifying witness in some cases.107
The admission or exclusion of a prior consistent or inconsistent statement is
left to the discretion of the trial judge.'0 8 These decisions are not subject to
review "except upon a showing of an abuse of discretion."'109 A trial court has
App. 358, 361, 289 S.E.2d 86, 88 (1982). North Carolina Rules of Evidence exclude rule
801(d)(1)(B) of the federal rules. See N.C.R. EViD. 801. Federal rule 801(d)(l) indicates that a
statement is not hearsay if the witness testifies under oath at a trial or hearing, is subject to cross-
examination, and "the statement is... consistent with [the declarant's] testimony and is offered to
rebut an express or implied charge against [the declarant] of recent fabrication or improper influence
or motive." FD. R. EviD. 801(d)(1). This rule permits some prior consistent statements to be used
both for corroboration and as substantive evidence. See United States v. Harris, 761 F.2d 394, 399-
400 (1985).
100. 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 43, § 51, at 236-37.
101. Id. § 52, at 240.
102. State v. Burton, 322 N.C. 447, 450, 368 S.E.2d 630, 632 (1988) (quoting State v. Ramey,
318 N.C. 457, 469, 349 S.E.2d 566, 574 (1986)).
103. State v. Rogers, 299 N.C. 597, 606, 264 S.E.2d 89, 95 (1980) (Exum, J., concurring).
104. State v. Ramey, 318 N.C. 457, 469, 349 S.E.2d 566, 573 (1986). Therefore, slight differ-
ences between the testimony and the statement do not make the statement inadmissible. State v.
Covington, 290 N.C. 313, 337, 226 S.E.2d 629, 646 (1976); see also State v. Riddle, 316 N.C. 152,
159, 340 S.E.2d 75, 79 (1986) (allowing prior consistent statements even if they contradict another
witness's testimony).
105. State v. McAdoo, 35 N.C. App. 364, 367, 241 S.E.2d 336, 338, disc. rev. denied, 295 N.C.
93 (1978). A third person's prior statement, of course, could be admissible if it satisfies an exception
to the hearsay rule or is used in a way so that it is not hearsay. I H. BANDIS, supra note 43, § 52, at
244.
106. State v. McMillan, 55 N.C. App. 25, 30, 284 S.E.2d 526, 530 (1981) (citing State v. Miller,
288 N.C. 582, 596, 220 S.E.2d 326, 336 (1975)).
107. See State v. Riddle, 316 N.C. 152, 159, 340 S.E.2d 75, 79 (1986) (testimony of protective
services worker discussing prior conversation used to corroborate victim's testimony); State v.
Squire, 302 N.C. 112, 117, 273 S.E.2d 688, 691-92 (1981) (witness testimony about co-perpetrator's
statements used to corroborate another witness); Paris v. Carolina Portable Aggregates, Inc., 271
N.C. 471, 481, 157 S.E.2d 131, 138-39 (1967) (plaintiff's prior statement treated as corroboration of
expert witness, not plaintiff).
108. Cf Inman v. Harper, 2 N.C. App. 103, 108, 162 S.E.2d 629, 633 (1968) (exclusion of prior
consistent statements not reversible error).
109. State v. Thompson, 314 N.C. 618, 626, 336 S.E.2d 78, 82 (1985).
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abused its discretion only "upon a showing that its ruling was so arbitrary that it
could not have been the result of a reasoned decision."' 110 North Carolina's
statute states the test as whether "there is a reasonable possibility that, had the
error in question not been committed, a different result would have been reached
at the trial."' 11
In State v. Hunt the Supreme Court of North Carolina confronted the use
of prior inconsistent and consistent statements when impeaching one's own wit-
ness. The court employed a five-part analysis to examine the issue.' 12 In each
part, the court set out several general rules governing the case: 1) A party can-
not use extrinsic evidence to prove a collateral matter; 2) impeachment with rule
607 cannot be used as mere subterfuge; 3) an effective limiting instruction is
essential when impeaching one's own witness; 4) prior hearsay statements can-
not be used to corroborate the testimony of another witness; and 5) rule 403 also
restricts impeachment of one's own witness.
In the first part, the court stated that initially the trial judge admitted the
statements for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of the State's own wit-
ness, Marie.113 The court noted that rule 607 allowed the State to impeach its
own witness, but that the general principles of cross-examination also applied
when impeaching one's own witness.' 14 As a result, the court applied the gen-
eral rule that a party cannot use extrinsic evidence to prove prior inconsistent
statements "where the questions concern matters collateral to the issues." 1 15
The court said collateral matters include "testimony contradicting a witness's
denial that he made a prior statement when that testimony purports to reiterate
the substance of the statement." 116 Therefore, the State could call Officer
Daulton to contradict Marie's denial that she made a prior statement to the
police, but Officer Daulton could not testify to the substance of Marie's prior
statement. 
117
In the second part of its analysis, the court adopted the federal courts' hold-
ing that "impeachment by prior inconsistent statement may not be permitted
where employed as a mere subterfuge to get before the jury evidence not other-
wise admissible." 1i8 The court went beyond that and inferred from the federal
courts' decisions the principle that, except in three "rare' situations, a party
110. Id. (citing State v. Wilson, 313 N.C. 516, 538, 330 S.E.2d 450, 465 (1985)).
111. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1443(a) (1988).
112. Hunt, 324 N.C. at 348-354, 378 S.E.2d at 757-60.
113. Id. The court noted that analyzing the admissibility of the statements was complicated
because "they appear to have been admitted for both crediblity and substantive purposes under the
authorization of more than one of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence." Hunt, 324 N.C. at 348,
378 S.E.2d at 757. The court said it had to examine not only the stated grounds for using the
statements and the trial court's reasoning, but also the "purposes for which they were actually used."
Id. See supra text accompanying notes 16-31.
114. Id
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 348-49, 378 S.E.2d at 757.
118. Id. at 349, 378 S.E.2d at 757 (quoting United States v. Morlang, 531 F.2d 183, 190 (4th Cir.
1975)). If parties use subterfuge, they are "taking advantage of the jury's likely confusion regarding
the limited purpose of impeachment evidence." Id.
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impeaches its own witness primarily to get an inadmissible statement before the
jury." 9 The court stated that the exceptional cases when a party impeaches in
good faith have included: 1) when the witness's testimony was "extensive and
vital to the government's case;" 2) when the party calling the witness was genu-
inely surprised by his reversal; and 3) when the trial court followed the introduc-
tion of the statement with an effective limiting instruction. 120 The court noted
that Marie's testimony was not critical to the State's case,12 ' it was not intro-
duced in good faith, 122 and it was not followed with an effective limiting
instruction. 123
In its third section of the analysis, the court detailed why the trial court's
limiting instructions were not effective. The court stated that the trial court
initially instructed the jury to consider Marie's prior statements only for the
purpose of evaluating the officer's credibility, but it failed to give this warning
when the statements were read to Marie or when Officer Daulton reiterated
them during his direct examination. 124 The supreme court said that as a result
of this failure, the prosecution actually used the prior statements as substantive
evidence, and any later restriction on their use was futile. 125 The court held that
because the statements were hearsay, the State could not use them substantively
even if they corroborated another witness. 126
In the fourth part, the court said that Marie's prior statements could not be
used to corroborate Officer Daulton's testimony. 127 The court held that the
prior statements should only have been used to show that Marie made the state-
ments to the officer on a certain date, but not to prove the facts in those state-
ments. 128 The court stated that "extrajudicial declarations of someone other
than the witness purportedly being corroborated" cannot be used as prior con-
sistent statements. 129
In the final part, the court held that, in any case, the prior statements failed
the balancing test of North Carolina rule 403.130 The court said that the state-
ments' prejudice far outweighed the need to show "Marie to be less than credible
... or the need to bolster Officer Daulton's credibility."' 13 1 Therefore, the court
119. Id. at 350, 378 S.E.2d at 758.
120. Id.
121. The court stated that except for the brief testimony about the color of her bicycle, Marie's
testimony provided no substantive evidence for the State. Id. at 351, 378 S.E.2d at 758.
122. Id. at 351, 378 S.E.2d at 758-59. The court noted that the prosecutor knew that the defend-
ant's counsel had visited Marie while she was in jail in Atlanta in 1985 and believed that this visit
persuaded Marie not to talk or testify. Id. at 351, 378 S.E.2d at 759. In fact, Marie told officers
accompanying her back to North Carolina that she would not testify. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 352, 378 S.E.2d at 759.
126. Id. The court added that statements that the declarant has denied do not corroborate or
strengthen the testimony of another witness. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. (quoting I H. BRANDIs, supra note 43, § 52, at 243).
130. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
131. Hunt, 324 N.C. at 353, 378 S.E.2d at 760. The court said that the statements may have
carried more weight in the jurors' minds because of the doubts surrounding the testimony of the
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said the trial court had abused its discretion in admitting the statements and
ordered a new trial.132
In Hunt, the North Carolina Supreme Court examined two issues involved
in impeaching one's own witness. Most importantly, it restricted rule 607 and
the situations in which a party can use the rule to impeach one's own witness
with prior statements. Second, it clarified when a party can introduce the prior
statements of its own impeached witness as corroboration of another witness's
testimony.
In examining the first issue, Hunt established for North Carolina the rule
already accepted by the federal courts: A party cannot introduce for substantive
use hearsay evidence "under the guise of impeachment evidence." 133 The court
adopted the test of whether a party employed impeachment as "mere subter-
fuge" to get inadmissible hearsay before the jury.134 "Subterfuge" is involved
whenever a party impeaches its own witness "for theprimary purpose of placing
before the jury substantive evidence which is not otherwise admissible." 1 35 The
Hunt court was correct that the prosecutor called Marie as subterfuge for the
primary purpose of impeaching her with impermissible hearsay. Marie testified
to "little if anything of value to the state," 1 3 6 and the State knew before she
testified that she would not cooperate by reiterating her prior statements.137
The court's restriction on rule 607 is necessary because it prevents a party
from intentionally introducing inadmissible statements as impeachment know-
ing that "despite the court's instruction to the contrary, the jury will give the
statement substantive weight." 138 Although rule 607 as written allows impeach-
ment by any means, such a reading of rule 607 would usurp the common-law
three witnesses who identified the defendant. Id. The court noted the "limited opportunity for
observation of the witness who drove by, certain discrepancies in the description of the witness who
reported the assault, and the belated identification of defendant by the third witness." Id. at 352-53,
378 S.E.2d at 760. In addition, the statements may have been unreliable because of Marie's
problems with telling the truth in the past and her fear of being implicated. Id. at 354, 378 S.E.2d at
760.
132. Id. at 344, 378 S.E.2d at 754-55. The dissenting opinion written by Justice Mitchell agreed
that the trial court erred by allowing the State to impeach Marie with her unsworn statements. Id.
at 356, 378 S.E.2d at 761 (Mitchell, J., dissenting). Justice Mitchell, however, said that the error was
not prejudicial and "did not affect the outcome at trial." Id. at 356, 378 S.E.2d at 761-62 (Mitchell,
J., dissenting). The dissent then reviewed the evidence against the defendant, which it called "over-
whelming." Id. at 356, 378 S.E.2d at 762 (Mitchell, J., dissenting). In light of that evidence, the
dissent said that the jury did not give any significant weight to the unsworn statements of "a retarded
fourteen-year-old who had been a prostitute since she was eleven." Id. at 358, 378 S.E.2d at 763
(Mitchell, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that the defendant, who carried the burden to show "a
reasonable possibility that.., a different result would have been reached at the trial," had not met
that burden. Id. at 358-59, 378 S.E.2d at 763 (Mitchell, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 350, 378 S.E.2d at 758.
134. Id. at 349, 378 S.E.2d at 757 (quoting United States v. Morlang, 531 F.2d 183, 190 (4th Cir.
1975)).
135. United States v. Miller, 664 F.2d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
854 (1982).
136. Hunt, 324 N.C. at 351, 378 S.E.2d at 758.
137. Id. at 351, 378 S.E.2d at 759. The prosecutor asked Marie if she had told officers that "she
was not going to testify," which indicated that the State was on notice. Id.
138. Ordover, Surprisel That Damaging Turncoat Witness is Still with Us: An Analysis of Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence 607, 801(d)(1)(A) and 403, 5 HovsTRA L. REv. 65, 66 (1976).
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principle that "introduction of [prior unsworn] testimony, even where limited to
impeachment, necessarily increases the possibility that a defendant may be con-
victed on the basis of unsworn evidence." 139 The Hunt court's restriction on
evidence disguised as impeachment is consistent with the commentary to North
Carolina rule 607, which states that the prior statements "must in fact be im-
peaching."' 4 This indicates that the North Carolina legislature did not want
parties to impeach their own witnesses when the prior statements do not contra-
dict the witness but actually introduce new evidence. The holding is also consis-
tent with the legislature's refusal to permit any use of prior inconsistent
statements as substantive evidence.141
The Hunt court, however, went beyond the restrictions on rule 607 that the
legislature had in mind by stating that a party rarely impeaches its own witness
with prior statements without being motivated primarily by a desire to put the
substance of the statements before the jury. 142 This view will restrict rule 607
drastically so that a party can impeach its own witness only in exceptional cases.
After Hunt, North Carolina courts will find good faith impeachment in only
three instances: first, when the witness's testimony is extensive and vital to the
government's case; second, when the party calling the witness is genuinely sur-
prised by the testimony; and third, when the trial court follows the introduction
of the statement with an effective limiting instruction. 143
The first situation is a logical one because if the witness's testimony is im-
portant to the party, the party obviously has called the witness for some reason
other than merely to introduce impermissible evidence. Testimony that is "ex-
tensive and vital" is clear evidence that impeachment of this witness by the call-
ing party is not subterfuge. A requirement, however, that the testimony be
"extensive and vital" is too stringent. A party may need to call a witness to add
some small but important detail to the case, but still may need to impeach that
witness on other damaging testimony. 144 For example, a party may call a wit-
ness to testify about a fact that could link two events, but still may need to
impeach that witness either to take the wind out of the opponent's cross-exami-
139. United States v. Morlang, 531 F.2d 183, 190 (4th Cir. 1975).
140. N.C.R. EvID. 607 commentary.
141. Unlike the Federal Rules of Evidence, the North Carolina rules do not permit any substan-
tive use of prior inconsistent statements. See N.C.R. EVID. 801 commentary. See supra note 46 and
accompanying text. Compare FED. R. EvID. 801(d) (permitting the substantive use of prior incon-
sistent statements in some circumstances) with N.C.R. EvID. 801(d) (omitting the section treating
prior inconsistent statements as non-hearsay evidence).
142. Hunt, 324 N.C. at 350, 378 S.E.2d at 758.
143. Id.
144. Although the Hunt court stated that the "extensive and vital" requirement had been recog-
nized by the federal courts, this factor actually is more rigid than the federal courts' rule against
impeaching one's own witness for the "primary purpose" of getting impermissible evidence before
the jury. United States v. Miller, 664 F.2d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 854 (1982).
The DeLillo case cited by the court for this "extensive and vital" factor did state that the impeached
witness's testimony was "essential in many areas of the government's case." United States v. De-
Lillo, 620 F.2d 939, 946 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 835 (1980). Yet it actually was hesitant in
restricting impeachment with prior statements unless they were introduced "with the primary aim of
getting to the jury a statement impeaching [the witness]." Id. The DeLillo court only pointed out
that the testimony was essential as clear evidence that the party was not using subterfuge.
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nation or to clarify a fact that the witness stated incorrectly. Under the "exten-
sive and vital" test of the Hunt court, a party could not impeach such a witness
because the testimony is not elaborate and absolutely essential to the party's
case. A lesser requirement-for example, a requirement that the testimony be
"important and helpful"-would allow such a witness to testify and still ensure
that parties do not use impeachment primarily as subterfuge. A requirement
that the testimony be important is more in line with what the North Carolina
legislature had in mind when it revoked the voucher rule and enacted rule 607.
However, in Hunt, under either the court's "extensive and vital" standard or a
more relaxed "importance" standard, Marie's testimony still would have
failed.' 45
The second situation-when the party calling the witness is genuinely sur-
prised-was one of the exceptions to the pre-607 voucher rule. 146 Surprise may
indicate that the party is not motivated by subterfuge in its impeachment. 14 7
Surprise, however, should not be a requirement because a party may call a wit-
ness it knows "would give evidence both helpful and harmful to it, [thinking]
that the harmful aspect could be nullified by introducing the witness's prior in-
consistent statement." 14 8 The Hunt court's second factor contradicts courts
that have stated that "[r]ule 607 is not limited to occasions where the party
calling the witness is surprised or misled by the testimony." 149
A better approach would be to impose a good-faith standard on the party
impeaching its own witness.150 Under such a standard, the court would ex-
amine whether the party impeached the witness in good faith by determining
whether the party believed the witness would testify to some important evidence
or whether the party called the witness primarily to introduce impermissible
hearsay. This standard would ensure that a party will not call a witness when it
knows he will not testify to anything of value, and yet would allow the party to
impeach the witness on the harmful parts of the testimony. For example, if the
testimony is important, that would indicate a party's good faith and lack of sub-
terfuge. And, if the testimony had no importance, the court could examine
whether the party acted in good faith and was unaware that no important testi-
mony would result.
145. Marie testified only to the color of her bicycle and responses to challenges of credibility and
bias, and the State was on notice that she would not testify to anything of importance. Hunt, 374
N.C. at 351, 378 S.E.2d at 758-59.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 64-65.
147. For example, a party may think that a witness will testify to something of importance that
would satisfy the first situation, but at trial be surprised that the witness will not testify.
148. United States v. Webster, 734 F.2d 1191, 1193 (7th Cir. 1984).
149. Robinson v. Watts Detective Agency, 685 F.2d 729, 740 (Ist Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S.
1105 (1982). The case that the Hunt court cited in stating that a party should be genuinely surprised
actually disavowed requiring surprise. See Webster, 734 F.2d at 1193. That court said: "[W]e think
it would be a mistake to graft [a surprise] requirement to Rule 607 .. " Id.; see also United States
v. Frappier, 807 F.2d 257, 259 (1st Cir. 1986) (allowing impeachment of one's own witness unless
there was "no relevant contribution" in the witness's testimony), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 835 (1987).
But see Graham, supra note 64, at 1617 (proposing that rule 607 be amended to include surprise
requirement).
150. See Webster, 734 F.2d at 1193 (advocating a good-faith standard be imposed, and not a
surprise requirement).
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This is a better standard because if the party is not surprised by the harmful
evidence, the party should not have to choose between "not calling at all a wit-
ness from whom it expects to elicit genuinely helpful evidence" and calling that
witness without impeaching him. 151 If the party is surprised, it should have an
opportunity to impeach the witness if it acts in good faith and believed some-
thing important would result. Instead of examining whether the State "ap-
peared to know before Marie was called to the stand that she would not
cooperate,"1 52 the Hunt court should only have examined whether the prosecu-
tor impeached in good faith. In Hunt, under either a surprise or a good-faith
standard, the court should not have admitted the statements because the prose-
cutor was not surprised by the denial and did not act in good faith by calling
Marie solely for the purpose of introducing the prior statements.
The third situation in which the Hunt court indicated that a party can im-
peach its own witness is when the judge gives an effective limiting instruction.
This third factor is essential. The Hunt court was correct that the trial court's
instructions failed in not effectively limiting the statements' use when the prose-
cutor read the statements to Marie, when he introduced them substantively dur-
ing the officer's testimony, 153 and when the judge reiterated them in the final
charge to the jury.1 54 The Hunt court's emphasis on instructions will help en-
sure that juries use inconsistent statements of an impeached witness only for
"determining the witness's crediblity."' 155 Yet by including "an effective limit-
ing instruction" as one of the three exceptional cases in which it would find no
subterfuge, the court implied that a jury instruction alone could justify impeach-
ment of one's own witness.156 Even with an instruction, commentators cite "the
notorious inability of juries to ignore substantively evidence introduced solely
for purposes of impeachment."' 157 Therefore, a jury instruction alone is not
enough to assure that rule 607 is used properly.' 5 The instruction must be
accompanied by other safeguards, such as evidence that the party did not call
the witness "solely for the purpose of introducing otherwise inadmissible
151. Id.
152. Hunt, 324 N.C. at 351, 378 S.E.2d at 758.
153. The statements could not be introduced as substantive evidence because the North Carolina
Rules of Evidence do not permit any substantive use of prior consistent or inconsistent statements, as
does Federal Rule of Evidence 801. See 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 43, § 46, at 219, § 52, at 242 n.97;
supra text accompanying note 41.
154. Hunt, 324 N.C. at 352, 378 S.E.2d at 759.
155. 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 43, § 46, at 219.
156. Hunt, 324 N.C. at 350, 378 S.E.2d at 758. The court used "or," not "and," between the
three exceptional cases, indicating that any of the three would be enough. Id.
157. Graham, supra note 64, at 1615. In the hearings on adoption of federal rule 607, one
speaker noted the dangers of allowing impeachment testimony: "Although technically not substan-
tive evidence, the impact on the trier of fact, whether judge or jury, of the extra-judicial statements
may be substantial. As trial lawyers recognize, limiting instructions to jurors have little effect, if
any." Hearings on HR. 5463 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess.
304 (1974) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Herbert Semmel).
158. In fact, the cases that the Hunt court cited for this proposition focused not on the limiting
instruction but on the fact that witness's actual testimony was important to the calling party. See
United States v. DeLillo, 620 F.2d 939, 946 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1006 (1980); United
States v. Long Soldier, 562 F.2d 601, 605 (8th Cir. 1977).
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evidence." 159
In addition, an effective limiting instruction does not indicate that the party
acted in good faith and in the absence of subterfuge. It only indicates that the
judge acted properly in agreeing to tell the jury to limit the statements to their
proper use. When the Hunt court stated that an effective limiting instruction
indicates "good faith and a lack of subterfuge," the court was confusing the
judge's competence with the party's good faith. The court, therefore, should not
have lumped this factor with the other two factors, but instead addressed it sepa-
rately as an overriding requirement regardless of the party's good faith.
The Hunt court correctly recognized that the trial court's error was com-
pounded by the use of extrinsic evidence--Officer Daulton's testimony-to
prove Marie's prior inconsistent statements for a collateral issue.160 Marie's
prior statement involved the defendant's alibi, which was a material issue. As
one court noted, "[T]here can be little doubt that the witness's alibi testimony
was itself material . . . . 'This testimony went to the very heart of the case
... . ", 161 Yet the Hunt court correctly focused on the relationship of the state-
ments to Marie's testimony, not on the prior statement's content alone, to deter-
mine materiality.1 62 The prosecution could not prove Marie's statements by
extrinsic evidence because although the statements did concern "the subject-
matter in regard to which [the witness was] examined," the witness's testimony
was not material to an issue in the case.1 63 Marie's testimony was collateral
because Marie denied her prior inconsistent statements, instead of testifying in-
consistently with her statements. 164 Therefore, the substance of the statements
was no longer important or contradictory because Marie had not yet "testified to
something with which they [were] inconsistent." 165 Therefore, the prosecution
was bound by Marie's answers to the questions about the statements "in the
sense that he may not contradict it by the testimony of others."' 6 6 The court
was correct that the prosecution could call Officer Daulton only to impeach
Marie about the fact that she had given the statements to him on a certain date,
but not to indicate the substance of those statements.
159. Long Soldier, 562 F.2d at 605.
160. See State v. Williams, 322 N.C. 452, 455, 368 S.E.2d 624, 626 (1988).
161. State v. Green, 296 N.C. 183, 193-94, 250 S.E.2d 197, 204 (1978) (quoting State v.
WeUmon, 222 N.C. 215, 218, 22 S.E.2d 437, 439 (1942)).
162. See, eg., id. at 192-94, 250 S.E.2d at 203-04; State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 198, 213, 166 S.E.2d
652, 662-63 (1969).
163. Green, 296 N.C. at 193, 250 S.E.2d at 204 (quoting State v. Patterson, 24 N.C. (1 Ired.) 346,
353 (1842)).
164. See id. at 192-93, 250 S.E.2d at 203-04. In Green, for example, the witness testified incon-
sistently with his prior statement and then denied making the statement. Id. at 192, 250 S.E.2d at
203. Because his testimony was material and the statements related to it, "the State could introduce
extrinsic testimony of Bruce Ray's prior inconsistent statement where such statement conflicted with
the subject matter of his testimony." Id. at 194, 250 S.E.2d at 204; see Moore, 275 N.C. at 213, 166
S.E.2d at 662-63 (1969); Williams, 322 N.C. at 456, 368 S.E.2d at 626-27.
165. 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 43, § 46, at 219.
166. Id. § 48, at 227. However, the cross-examiner can "at some point, exhibit or divulge the
contents of a prior statement" of a collateral issue in the questions. Id. § 48, at 227 n.31. This
means that the party cannot call other witnesses to testify to the substance, but may reveal the
substance of the statements in its questions on cross.
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In its second major issue, the Hunt decision justifiably restricted the use of
the impeached witness's prior statements to corroborate another witness. First,
Marie's prior statements could not corroborate Officer Daulton's testimony, ex-
cept to confirm his testimony that Marie had made statements to him. 167 Those
statements were hearsay statements of Marie, not prior statements of the officer,
and so were not admissible substantively as corroborative evidence.1 68 The
hearsay statements that Marie denied could not corroborate Officer Daulton's
testimony because a "corroborative statement is admissible only to corroborate
the testimony of the witness who made the statement."169 Second, Marie's denial
was contradictory and "the witness's prior contradictory statements may not be
admitted under the guise of corroborating his testimony." 170 Because Marie
denied the statements, they could not be used to corroborate the police officer's
testimony. If Marie had agreed in direct examination that she made the state-
ments, the State could then have used that testimony to corroborate Officer
Daulton's testimony.
Along with the other failings of these prior statements, Marie's prior state-
ments failed the balancing test under rule 403.171 Although in this case the
statements were relevant under rule 401, the Hunt court correctly stated that
rule 403 should have excluded them because the probative value of subterfuge
statements was substantially less than the prejudice to the defendant. The court,
though, stated that even if the statements were not objectionable for other rea-
sons, they would fail the rule 403 balancing test. This conclusion is not justified.
If the prosecutor had not violated the rule 607 limitation and the extrinsic-evi-
dence rule, the statements' high probative value would have offset the strong
prejudice to the defendant. Because of the Hunt court's restrictive view of "pro-
bative value," the rule 403 balancing test in cases when a party impeaches its
own witness may be more likely to exclude prior statements even in the absence
of subterfuge.
In sum, the admission of these prior statements flunked on a number of
grounds: They were used as subterfuge; they were not accompanied by the
proper limiting instruction; they were collateral and yet were introduced with
167. Hunt, 324 N.C. at 352, 378 S.E.2d at 759.
168. The North Carolina rule is that prior statements "are admitted, not as substantive evidence
of the facts stated, but solely for the purpose of affirming the credibility of the witness; and upon
proper request, the jury must be instructed accordingly." 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 43, § 52, at 242
(footnotes omitted). North Carolina's evidence rules do not include federal rule 801(d)(l)(B) per-
mitting substantive use of prior consistent statements. This indicates that North Carolina's legisla-
ture was hesitant to allow even sworn prior consistent statements as substantive evidence. Generally,
though, North Carolina allows the "utmost latitude" in receiving this kind of evidence to support a
witness's credibility. Id. § 50, at 232.
169. State v. McMillan, 55 N.C. App 25, 30, 284 S.E.2d 526, 530 (1981); see 1 H. BRANDIS,
supra note 43, § 52, at 243. The trial court, however, was not totally unjustified in allowing these
statements because some courts have permitted others' declarations to corroborate a witness. Id.
§ 52, at 244; see supra note 107; State v. Erby, 56 N.C. App. 358, 362, 289 S.E.2d 86, 88-89 (1982)
(allowing patrolman's testimony to corroborate defendant's testimony).
170. State v. Ramey, 318 N.C. 457, 469, 349 S.E.2d 566, 574 (1986).
171. Rule 403 requires that the probative value of all evidence substantially outweigh the preju-
dice to the defendant and the confusion of issues for the jury. See supra notes 75-76 and accompany-
ing text.
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extrinsic evidence; they were not proper corroborating evidence; and they failed
the rule 403 balancing test. Although on individual points the court went too
far in restricting rule 607, the Hunt court clearly was justified in finding the
statements inadmissible in this particular case.17 2
The decision in Hunt will force North Carolina attorneys to satisfy more
stringent requirements before impeaching their own witnesses under rule 607.
Indeed, after Hunt, a party will rarely, if ever, be able to impeach its own wit-
ness. When impeaching one's own witness, a party will be scrutinized to see
whether it is motivated "primarily (or solely) by a desire to put the substance of
that statement before the jury."1 73 In deciding this, judges in North Carolina
will consider whether the testimony is "extensive and vital" to the party,
whether the party was surprised, and whether a limiting instruction was
given. 174 In addition, parties will not be able to introduce other witnesses' testi-
mony about the statements when the impeached witness denies ever having
made the prior statements. The courts also will not admit the prior statements
of one's own witness to corroborate another witness's testimony about those
hearsay statements.
The Hunt court was justified in restricting the open-ended wording of rule
607. Rule 403 does not provide a sufficient and consistent safeguard against
subterfuge impeachment because the 403 balancing test often produces differing
results from a single fact situation. However, the standard that the court created
went too far in restricting impeachment of one's own witness. This is clear be-
cause the decision nearly wipes out the effect of rule 607 by reinstating a new
form of the old voucher rule. Admittedly, the decision does not hold that a
party may never impeach one's own witness as the voucher rule did. However,
the Hunt court concedes it will take a "rare" and "exceptional" case for a court
to allow impeachment of one's own witness. The requirements of surprise or
"extensive and vital" testimony return North Carolina's law nearly to where it
stood just before rule 607 was developed: impeachment of one's own witness is
permitted only if the party was surprised, affirmatively damaged and misled by
the witness. This restriction on rule 607 clearly goes against what the North
Carolina legislature intended in passing the rule. As the commentary to rule 607
states, the legislature intended "to abandon[] the traditional common law rule
that a party 'vouches' for a witness by calling him."'175 Indeed, although the
Hunt court believed it was modelling its standard on the federal courts' interpre-
172. The court deemed the inclusion of the statements to be grave enough to reverse for "abuse
of discretion." Hunt, 324 N.C. at 353, 378 S.E.2d at 760. The dissent, however, argued that the
decision should not be reversed because "[tihe record does not support the conclusion that the jury
would have reached a different result at trial, had the evidence of her prior statements not been
admitted." Id. at 359, 378 S.E.2d at 763 (Mitchell, J., dissenting). The prior statements did contra-
dict the defendant's alibi. Yet the defendant was implicated by three witnesses. In addition, the jury
was not likely to give Marie's statements as much credence after the defendant impeached her with
witnesses who described her inability to tell the truth. Despite the evidence implicating the defend-
ant and Marie's questionable credibility, the majority may have held that the trial court abused its
discretion because it wanted to give more force to its new interpretation of rule 607.
173. Id. at 350, 378 S.E.2d at 758.
174. Id.
175. N.C.R. EVID. 607 commentary.
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tation, the Hunt court actually goes much further than any other federal court
has gone in inhibiting rule 607.
Instead, the limitation on rule 607 should be whether the impeachment was
for the primary purpose of introducing impermissible hearsay. In determining
this, courts should examine first, whether the testimony itself had some impor-
tance to the State, and second, whether the impeaching party acted in good faith
if the testimony was not important to the State. This test would help ensure that
rule 607 is not restricted to the point of returning to the pre-607 voucher rule.
Yet it would also prevent the rule from "open[ing] the back door to evidence
which is inadmissible through the front door." 176
COLLEEN GALE TREML
176. Hearings, supra note 157.
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